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INTRODUCTION
High-powered incentive contracts based on individual and/or business-unit financial performance metrics can motivate employees to behave entrepreneurially, but can also generate distortions in the allocation of employees' effort. Specifically, such contracts can lead to excessive focus on short term, individual wealth maximizing activities, at the expense of longer term organizational sustainability and growth (Baker et al. 1994; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) . One way that organizations may be able to correct for such distorted incentives while fostering employees' entrepreneurialism is through promoting behaviors aligned with the long term strategy and profitability of the organization. In this study, we analyze the implementation of a 360° performance assessment system focused on organizational strategy and values in a retail chain, and assess its effectiveness in improving goal congruence and fostering behaviors in line with the long-term profitability of the firm.
360
o performance assessment systems consist of appraisals of individuals by multiple raters such as subordinates, supervisors, peers, customers, and, in many cases, the individuals themselves. These evaluations typically relate to dimensions of financial and non-financial performance, as well as behaviors related to leadership, communication, participation, and teamwork (London and Beatty 1993) , that are difficult to measure by other means. In this study, we focus on a values-based 360 o performance assessment system (hereafter, 360 o system) focused on organizational goals and values that are not explicitly linked to rewards but that act as a complement to other financial-based incentive systems in the organization.
Understanding the effectiveness of 360° systems for improving the alignment between organizational goals and those of its employees is important to the extent that it provides opportunities to optimize effort allocations. In particular, exploring the interaction between highpowered monetary incentives and 360° systems on goal congruence might offer insights on how to approach such optimization without necessarily incurring material increases in the firm's bonding costs, or costs associated with incentive contract renegotiations (Jensen and Meckling 1976) .
We posit that the introduction of a values-based 360° assessment system contributes to promoting goal alignment in three ways. First, it enhances goal clarity by formalizing organizational values and goals and connecting them to specific behaviors that are conducive to their attainment. Second, it activates employees' organizational identification by highlighting a set of inspiring values and goals and empowering employees to contribute to the success of the collective (van Knippenberg 2000) . Third, it provides implicit incentives to employees interested in pursuing a career within the organization, as it communicates what is valued by the organization and encourages co-worker monitoring on behaviors that could contribute or detract to the organization's long term success.
While the literature has documented favorable effects of goal clarity, organizational identification and implicit incentives on performance and goal congruence, a 360° system might also unintendedly lead to suboptimal effort allocations, constraining its success. Driving a change in focus from short term financial measures of performance to a broader set of measures associated with the long term sustainability of the organization often requires increasing employees' attention toward forward-looking objectives, such as quality and customer satisfaction, that are likely to support the success of the business in the long run. These measures tend to be less timely as they typically do not have an immediate effect on financial results, and often exhibit low sensitivity or precision, as they can be influenced by subjective biases or by various other circumstances that are outside of the control of the employee (Banker and Datar 1989; Campbell 2008; Dikolli and Sedatole 2007; Ittner and Larcker 2003) .
Differences in the timeliness, sensitivity, and precision of the metrics included in an employee's performance evaluation mix can drive suboptimal effort allocations: Multitasking agents tend to devote more effort to those dimensions of performance that are more visible and more readily measured at the expense of other relevant but less evident or timely activities (Baker et al. 1988; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Tayler 2010) . Additionally, the presence and strength of the link between activities and explicit incentives may further influence the allocation of effort in favor of those measures that are more clearly associated with monetary incentives (Banker et al. 2000) . Finally, an increase in the number of behaviors that are expected from the employee might create confusion in terms of prioritization, resulting in lower performance (Ahearne et al. 2013; Babin and Boles 1996; Maas and Matejka 2009 ).
In order to examine the effectiveness of a values-based 360° assessment system on improving goal alignment in the presence of high-powered incentives, we helped a mobile phone retail chain based in India design and implement one of such systems. The implementation was structured as a randomized field experiment. A pre-existing monetary incentive plan across all stores encouraged behaviors that were short-term oriented: rewards were largely based on commissions for items sold. While generally congruent with the overall goals of the firm (i.e. growth and market share), the existing high-powered incentives had, in the past, introduced behaviors, such as customer deception or gaming, that were detrimental to the long term objectives of the organization. When the company was small, the managing director could personally monitor and shape the behaviors of employees through informal communication of the vision and values she held for the organization, including a focus on hard work, customer service, and honesty. However, as the company scaled-up and opportunities for direct communication and monitoring with all members of the organization decreased, such vision and values started to lose clarity and force.
In an effort to align the store staff's behavior toward longer-term organizational goals, management introduced, into half of the chain's stores, a formalized vision and core values, reinforced through a values-based 360° assessment system. The 360° system was designed to gauge the performance of each store manager. The store manager was chosen as the focus of the assessment since the store manager position was one of the most critical nodes in the organizational hierarchy. Not only were store managers responsible for their store employees and interactions with customers, but they shared with top management the responsibility to lead store teams toward a common goal. The 360 o system was chosen as a way to obtain information on everyday behaviors of the store manager that would be otherwise unobservable by higher management. The assessment program was exclusively focused on measuring the extent to which the store managers' behaviors were consistent with the organizational values articulated, and it was not tied to any additional monetary reward. The pre-existing incentive system was kept in place (i.e. pre-existing performance metrics and related monetary rewards were not modified).
We compare the stores' performance on various dimensions before and after the introduction of the 360° system, but before any feedback was provided to the store managers. Whereas extant literature on 360 o performance assessment programs focuses predominantly on the provision of feedback, we evaluate the effectiveness of enhancing the salience of organizational goals and values through such a system, and the expectation of performance assessments giving rise to implicit incentives. We draw inferences regarding the changes in store-level, wealth maximizing metrics versus the changes in metrics capturing behaviors that benefit the organization as a whole.
We complement our quantitative analyses with qualitative data from interviews conducted after the implementation.
We find that the introduction of the values-based 360 o assessment system, absent incremental monetary incentives, drives an improvement in measures of financial performance (i.e. sales, gross profits). These results are consistent with the 360° system positively impacting workers' effort levels, through an increase in goal clarity, activation of organizational identification, and/or implicit incentives. Surprisingly, we fail to find any significant effect explicitly attributable to the intervention with respect to other desired behaviors monitored by nonfinancial metrics unassociated with monetary incentives. Qualitative information gleaned from field interviews points to some features of the implementation of the 360 o system that might explain the lack of significant improvements along those dimensions. First, the interviews highlighted several instances where employees had a low level of recall and understanding of the core values that had been presented at the launch of the intervention. Second, those employees that had a clearer understanding of the newly introduced core values highlighted that they did not know how to attain the goal of giving more value to customers, and claimed not to be given appropriate tools to attain this goal (e.g. tools to manage customer relations or sufficient inventory). Third, the interviews uncovered some degree of employee frustration with respect to their interaction with higher management (i.e., not feeling adequately supported, not being paid their salary on time) which might have reduced credibility of the core values and impacted their motivation to go above and beyond in the interest of a collective that was not perceived as being supportive of them.
In summary, our results suggest that values-based 360° assessment systems can motivate employees to exert greater effort. Yet, our findings also suggest that a 360° system, while providing examples of desired behaviors aligned with each corporate value, might lead to (a) frustration, especially if employees don't perceive to be adequately supported by their organization, and (b) suboptimal allocations of effort, whereby employees focus on the subset of goals that are most timely, visible, well understood, and closely aligned with their financial incentives. We conjecture that these undesired consequences might be curbed with the provision of adequate training and support to facilitate the introduction of new shared organizational goals.
Our study offers several contributions to the literature and to the practice of management accounting. First, it extends the literature on 360° performance assessment systems, by providing field-based evidence of the positive impact these systems can have (at least with respect to certain dimensions of performance), consistent with their role in improving clarity, activating organizational identity, and providing implicit incentives. Second, we provide empirical evidence of potential side effects related to the introduction of multiple measures of performance that may undermine the effectiveness of a 360° system, potentially due to confusion with respect to the optimal allocation of effort across multiple goals. Third, we contribute to the literature on nonfinancial incentive systems, by showing how a values-based 360° assessment system can drive increased performance (at least on dimensions already rewarded with existing incentives) without the need for incremental explicit incentives. Our findings are valuable to practitioners in that they describe a powerful mechanism of motivation, and, at the same time, warn about potential pitfalls that might undermine its effectiveness.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review extant theories and empirical studies that are relevant for this study, and we develop our hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the field setting and the field experiment. Section 4 presents our research design. Next, we report our results and interpretations (Section 5), and our insights from qualitative information obtained via follow-up interviews with employees (Section 6). The last section concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Organizations that motivate their employees via incentive contracts based on financial measures of performance often use subjective performance assessments to overcome limitations of incentive contracts that neither capture nor promote all relevant behaviors associated with value creation (Baker et al. 1994; Gibbs et al. 2004 (Ittner and Larcker 1998a; Lambert 1998) .
greater job satisfaction and managerial performance (Prowse and Prowse 2009; Sawyer 1992; Hall 2008; Arnold et al. 2009 ).
Second, we build on the literature on organizational identification. Organizational identification is defined as the perception of "oneness with an organization and the experience of the organization's successes and failures as one's own" (Mael and Ashforth (1992) , p.103). To the extent a 360 o system can communicate and enforce distinctive, inspiring and/or shared organizational goals and values to its employees, it will contribute to building organizational identification (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Ashforth and Mael 1989; Mael and Ashforth 1992) .
Furthermore, involvement in the evaluation process of peers, superiors, and oneself, as part of the 360 o system, can provide employees with a perception of being active contributors to the success of the organization (Bettenhausen and Fedor 1997 ). An increase in organizational identity would increase employees' alignment with organizational goals and drive their desire to act in the best interest of the collective (van Knippenberg 2000; Ashforth and Mael 1989; Akerlof and Kranton 2000) .
Third, we refer to the literature on implicit incentives. Even where a 360 o system is primarily intended to be developmental rather than evaluative (i.e., it is not explicitly tied to rewards), the system is likely to give rise to implicit incentives, since the organization introduces employee accountability for desired behaviors beyond those captured by financial measures of performance (Kaplan and Norton 1992; Ittner and Larcker 1998b; Huselid 1995) . Employees will likely anticipate some linkage between 360° systems and discretionary or career-related outcomes (such as more favorable job assignments, promotions, or firings) which can contribute to employees' alignment with long-term goals (DeNisi and Kluger 2000; Campbell 2008; Gibbons and Murphy 1992) . Thus, the system introduces implicit incentives to perform, especially for those employees that seek to pursue a career within the organization. Additionally, the multi-source nature of the 360 o system introduces multi-directional monitoring, which further strengthens the implicit incentive contract (Becker and Huselid 1992; Prendergast 1999; Loughry and Tosi 2008) .
Fourth, notwithstanding the expected benefits of a 360° system, a shift in focus from financialbased measures of performance to a comprehensive set of financial and non-financial measures may lead to suboptimal allocation of effort on the part of employees for three reasons. First, the introduction of multiple measures of performance could lead to confusion among employees (especially among less experienced employees) to the extent they may not know where their allocation of effort would yield the greatest results (Griffith and Neely 2009 ). Second, employees may not invest in activities that are subjectively measured, if they think they could obtain favorable subjective evaluations by influencing their raters' opinions (Milgrom 1988) . Third, employees evaluated based on multiple performance measures will likely focus on a subset of tasks that are more readily measured and which yield the greatest pay-offs, rather than the full set required to drive organizational goals. Non-financial measures of performance introduced via 360° system including multiple measures tend to be more subjective, less precise, less timely, and less sensitive to effort than financial measures used in incentive contracts (Ittner and Larcker 1998b; Dikolli and Sedatole 2007; Tayler 2010) . Prior literature finds that individuals tend to allocate more effort toward performance dimensions that are more clearly measured; yield greater results in the short run; are more sensitive to the work they already know how to perform; and are associated with monetary incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Baker et al. 1988) . Thus, the subset of tasks where employees devote their effort may not necessarily include important elements required to drive long term organizational performance.
In our setting, just as in most settings where 360 o systems are introduced as a complement to financial-based incentives, many of the behaviors promoted by the financial incentive system overlap with behaviors promoted through the 360 o system. We conjecture that the performance effects of the 360 o system will differ based on whether or not the assessed behaviors are linked to measures for which high-powered incentives exist. We articulate our hypotheses in the three subsections below.
Effect of a values-based 360 o assessment system on financial measures linked to high-powered incentives
Our first empirical question is whether or not the introduction of a 360° system with no linkage to financial rewards will impact performance on dimensions already supported with high-powered incentives.
On the one hand, if the relation between financial performance and explicit incentives is unchanged, we should not observe any material change in effort allocation toward such measures.
Explicit monetary incentives are likely to be more powerful and immediate than any implicit incentives embedded in a values-based 360° assessment system, potentially yielding the latter incentives irrelevant.
On the other hand, the introduction of a 360° system could affect performance either positively or negatively. It could have a positive impact on financial performance due to an increase in goal clarity and/or by activating organizational identity. Increasing the salience of organizational goals and values, and the relation between financial performance and the success of the collective might motivate employees to exert greater effort and drive an improvement in the financial results. Yet the implementation of a 360° system could also have a negative effect on financial performance.
The novel dimensions of performance introduced with the 360 o system might be viewed as offering greater opportunities for improvement, whereas scope to improve on dimensions linked to the existing financial incentives may be viewed as limited (for instance, if employees feel that they are already performing at their best). Thus, employees might allocate effort toward the novel performance dimensions and away from known financial performance dimensions, particularly if the organization positions these new metrics as critical for the prolonged success of the collective.
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We attempt to resolve this tension by testing the following hypothesis, which we formalize in null form:
H1: The introduction of a values-based 360° assessment system does not affect workers'
performance on financial metrics rewarded in the existing incentive system.
Effect of a values-based 360 o assessment system on productive, nonfinancial measures emphasized by the system
Values-based 360 o assessment systems are most useful for evaluating performance with respect to complex jobs that require attention to multiple activities and interface with multiple counterparts, both internally (i.e. subordinates, peers, and superiors) and externally to the organization (i.e. customers and competitors) (DeNisi and Kluger 2000; Ghorpade 2000) . Such systems can increase goal clarity by describing the multiple activities needed to achieve organizational goals, and can drive organizational identification by highlighting distinctive goals and values, both of which are conducive to improved performance. Furthermore, 360° systems will likely promote productive behaviors beyond those related to financial rewards through implicit incentives related to the appraisal results.
However, the introduction of new metrics in addition to pre-existing ones exacerbates the challenges related to multitasking and could lead to sub-optimal allocation of effort. Employees may be confused about how to allocate their efforts to drive organizational value, and faced with seemingly incompatible or difficult goals, they may be motivated to focus only on known dimensions of performance. For example, employees that have been insofar incentivized to maximize daily sales might not feel adequately trained or equipped to deliver great customer service. Furthermore, employees may waste time trying to influence their raters' perceptions.
The introduction of a values-based 360 o assessment system will therefore improve performance with respect to productive behaviors that go beyond financial measures linked to rewards, only if the resulting increases in goal clarity, organizational identification, and implicit incentives prevail over any confusion and sub-optimal effort allocations linked to the increased scope of responsibilities for the employee. Since on balance we expect improvements in these productive behaviors, we formalize the following directional hypothesis:
H2: The introduction of a values-based 360° assessment system improves workers' performance on nonfinancial, productive metrics emphasized by the system, and not directly rewarded in the existing incentive system.
Effect of a values-based 360 o assessment system on counterproductive behaviors scrutinized by the system
In contrast with desired behaviors associated with dimensions of performance newly introduced by a 360° system, counterproductive behaviors (such as absenteeism, theft, and disrespect) are not new in the eyes of the employee. Therefore, there should be no confusion regarding what is expected. While detrimental behaviors are likely to have been discouraged all along, the introduction of a 360 o system should contribute to a decline in the incidence of such behaviors for two reasons: (1) increased scrutiny of dysfunctional behaviors via assessments from multiple raters should increase the power of implicit incentives associated with the consequences of being caught doing something wrong; and (2) the activation of organizational identification and the consequent desire to perform in the best interest of the collective should be reflected in a decline in dysfunctional behaviors and practices that are clearly detrimental to the company's profits and sustainability. Yet, introducing a broader spectrum of responsibilities for the employees (especially without appropriate supporting systems, such as training or the provision of adequate tools to facilitate the attainment of the new goals), might be perceived by the employees as a "onesided deal", especially in the absence of monetary incentives, possibly leading to no changes or even worsening the frequency of dysfunctional behaviors. The following hypothesis formalizes our prediction with respect to the change in observed dysfunctional behaviors:
H3: The introduction of a values-based 360° assessment system reduces workers' dysfunctional behaviors.
The next section describes the field setting for our study and the specifics of our field experiment.
RESEARCH SETTING
To test our hypotheses, we use data from a field experiment we conducted in collaboration with MoPhI, 3 a mobile phone retailer operating multiple stores in one of India's main cities. A typical store is led by a store manager, supported by a cashier, and staffed with a number of promoters representing various brands (e.g. Samsung, Nokia, Vodafone) whose products and/or services are offered in the store. 4 To emulate the entrepreneurial spirit, sense of ownership, and incentives of local mom-and-pop stores-the main competitors of the retail chain-the store managers and cashiers are primarily compensated via variable pay (the bulk of which comes in the 3 MoPhI is a fictitious name to protect the confidentiality of the company and the data shared with us. 4 All of the store managers at the retail chain were male, and typically in their 20s.
form of a commission for each product sold). The promoters are paid by their respective brands (i.e. they are not employees of MoPhI), though they are sometimes eligible to participate in certain sales-based incentive plans at the retailer. Furthermore, the retail chain often hires former promoters as cashiers or store managers.
MoPhI seeks to differentiate itself from the mom-and-pop stores in various ways: by offering a more extensive product and service assortment; by bundling products (through promotions) to enhance customers' perceptions of value; and by focusing on customized solutions and trustworthy service. The managing director communicates these defining elements of the company's value proposition extensively to the store staff-through personal visits to the individual stores, weekly meetings held at headquarters, and in communications via email and the company's information system. The managing director also strongly enforces the focus on trustworthy service by penalizing (which in some instances takes the form of firing) any employees found to have engaged in unethical behavior (e.g. theft, misleading customers).
While a reliance on the managing director's personal interactions with store teams had helped foster a strong company culture, the model was not compatible with MoPhI's ambitions to expand by opening many more stores-it simply was not feasible for the managing director to continue to provide individualized attention to each store. Furthermore, the managing director sought to encourage store teams, particularly store managers, to focus not only on short-term financial performance (which was strongly incentivized via the existing compensation structure), but also on longer-term behaviors needed to build a consistent and profitable brand (e.g. building longterm customer relations, not lowering prices simply in order to make a sale, providing feedback to team members). Thus, the managing director, in consultation with members of our research team, decided to implement a values-based 360° assessment system-with the store manager at its center.
As is typical of many retail chain organizations, store managers at MoPhI fulfill many important roles: they participate on a daily basis in interactions with customers and are largely responsible for facilitating the formation of positive, long term relationships with customers; they coordinate a team of individuals at the store, and have the responsibility to influence behaviors toward the attainment of organizational goals; and they are a critical link between the store and headquarters, whereby the onus largely falls on store managers to communicate needs to management regarding inventory levels, staffing problems, etc. Store managers are accountable for the ongoing performance of their stores and, in addition, they are supposed to be an example for the store staff with respect to behaviors conducive to the success of the organization. A 360 o system offers the opportunity to measure store manager performance on all the important roles that these managers fulfill. Since store staff should be best placed to evaluate the store manager, this type of system arguably represents a superior performance measurement system compared to a more traditional evaluation system whereby an assessment would be performed only by the store managers' supervisor.
The goals of the values-based 360° assessment system implemented at MoPhI included formalizing the company's core values and the expected behaviors associated with each value, as well as gaining a complete picture of how each store manager was performing in relation to the core values (by obtaining data from the store manager, his supervisor, his store team, and his customers) in order to provide individualized feedback and coaching to the managers. The intent of the 360° system was developmental, and it was presented to the employees as a tool that could help them develop and grow, and increase their chances of being promoted in the future (hence, it provided implicit incentives). To gain insights from customers, one customer per store was randomly selected each day to participate in a telephone survey. Customers were asked questions about their satisfaction with various aspects of the service they received (i.e. the knowledge and politeness of the store staff, etc.), and towards the end of the survey were asked how likely (on a scale from 0-Not At All
Likely to 10-Extremely Likely) it was that they would recommend the retail chain to a friend.
From this question, a Net Promoter Score can be calculated for each store, which is a popular metric for capturing how well a company is performing with respect to the customer experience.
The Net Promoter Score is calculated as the percentage of "promoters" (respondents giving a nine or ten), less the percentage of "detractors" (respondents giving a score up to and including six).
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Since the managing director was interested in understanding the effectiveness of a valuesbased 360° assessment system in achieving its intended aims, she readily agreed to set up the introduction of the system (which was developed and implemented via extensive consultation with the research team) as a field experiment, initially implementing the system into approximately half of the retail chain's stores. The selection of stores was randomized. However, we grouped stores in "blocks" if they were located sufficiently close to each other such that contamination effects would be a concern if one or more stores participated in the system while others did not. If any store in the block was randomly selected, all stores in the block participated in the system.
Participants in the selected stores were advised that the organization was piloting the system in a limited number of stores only, and were asked not to discuss the system with anyone beyond their store.
After fixing some technical difficulties 6 that arose during a first attempt to launch the system in late March 2015, the values-based 360° assessment system was officially "re-launched" in April 2015. The intervention began with an inspiring presentation and interactive session led by the managing director. Only members of the selected stores were invited to attend this session, which comprised two parts. The first part was focused on introducing the store teams to the company's strategy and values. It described the organization's strategy and how it fitted in its competitive landscape, and introduced the store teams to the company's newly formalized vision statement and core values (included in Appendix 3). The presentation also emphasized how important the roles of the store managers and the store teams were to the pursuit of the organization's values and longterm goals. During the second part, the managing director explained that a 360° system was to be implemented at the stores in attendance. The stated purpose of the system was to gain a comprehensive understanding of the support the store manager provided at the store level and the store manager's commitment to the organization's core values. Attendees were advised that the aggregated information from the surveys (confidentiality of individual responses was assured)
would be used to provide feedback and coaching to the store managers. After the system was explained, attendees were asked to complete the performance appraisal survey (Appendix 2).
18 of MoPhI's 39 stores located in a main city in India participated in the "re-launch" in April 2015. The vast majority of these stores had participated in the initial launch in March 2015, though some of the stores had only participated in the introductory presentation / interactive session, not the session about the 360° system. 7 Since this gives rise to complications regarding the correct grouping of stores in the time between the initial launch attempt and the re-launch, in our empirical analyses we drop all weeks between the two launches.
Our empirical tests focus on the effects of the introduction of the 360° system, rather than the provision of feedback to the store managers using the survey results. The surveys completed by the store managers and the store team members (cashier and promoters) were extremely favorable; store managers rated themselves an average of 4.8 across all survey questions, while store team members gave an average of 4.5. Yet, the store managers' direct supervisors gave them an average rating of 3.9. Our analyses do not reflect reactions of the store managers to these ratings, since the feedback sessions were held immediately after our sample period. Our interpretation of the highly favorable ratings, partly informed by conversations with the managing director, is that it was due to several factors, including: store managers wanting to paint themselves in the most favorable light, a lack of familiarity with surveys in India, the hierarchical nature of Indian society leading store team members to be hesitant to reveal anything negative about their store manager, and possible influence activities whereby the store managers may have asked their team members to give them high ratings.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the survey results to provide meaningful information, the company proceeded to hold feedback sessions with the store managers. However, due to the considerable effort in compiling all of the survey responses, summarizing these in a report, and planning for the feedback sessions, they were held a few months after the initial surveys were completed. By this time, a small number of store managers had left the organization, and for reasons unknown to the researchers, a handful of feedback sessions that should have taken place did not. Our sample period ends right before the feedback sessions took place.
While we are unable to empirically examine the effects of the system with a feedback component, we expect the intervention we study to have produced effects given that the presentation and survey completion were likely to raise awareness of the core values and the importance of the related behaviors among store managers, who would also anticipate being assessed again in the future. We supplement our quantitative data with qualitative interviews we conducted with the managing director and with a random sample of store managers and store teams after the surveys were administered.
RESEARCH DESIGN
We examine how treated stores (i.e. those participating in the values-based 360° assessment system) vis-à-vis control stores performed on three dimensions: 1) performance on metrics included in the existing incentive system (sales and profits); 2) performance on productive behaviors not related to monetary incentives (providing value to customers and customer satisfaction); and 3) counterproductive behaviors (unfavorable audit outcomes, gaming behaviors, unauthorized absenteeism, and tardiness). We associate measures of these three dimensions of performance with each of the core values (see Appendix 3).
To capture performance metrics that were already included in the pre-existing monetary incentive system and in line with the core value "We Our sample includes weekly observations for 35 stores (17 in the treatment group, and 18 in the control group) spanning 22 weeks, of which 11 are prior to the initial launch (pre-period), and 11 are subsequent to the re-launch (post-period). 11 We eliminate data for the last 3 weeks of the post-period for one store included in the treatment group, because the store manager unexpectedly left the organization and there was no replacement during those three weeks, yielding a total of 766 store-weeks. We have fewer observations when we examine customer satisfaction since the customer surveys began only three weeks before the first attempt to launch in March 2015, and we also have fewer observations when examining store audits since stores are typically audited less than once a month. Additionally, some metrics related to dysfunctional behaviors, such as gaming, absenteeism, and lateness, are only collected on a monthly basis.
In order to capture the effect of the intervention, we compare the performance along the performance metrics defined above between the treated stores and the stores included in the control group using a difference-in-differences statistical model. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
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9 Return% is measured as follows: [(average daily returns for the first week of the month) -(average daily returns for the rest of the month)]/(average daily returns for the rest of the month), where (average daily returns for the first week) = [(returns in week 1)/7], and (average daily returns for the rest of the month) = (returns for the rest of the month)/(number of days in the rest of the month). 10 Audits would assess the correspondence between inventory and cash represented in the local ledgers and their physical presence in the store. As a consequence of unfavorable audits, monetary penalties might also be inflicted depending on the gravity of the infraction. 11 Our pre-period includes the last 11 weeks before the first launch to keep correspondence between the length of the pre-period and the length of the post-period, in line with Charness and Gneezy (2009 Similarly, the percentage of promotion-based bundles (BundleInvoice) is below 34% for three quarters of the sample. Dysfunctional behaviors appear to be quite pervasive, thus further justifying the need for the intervention. Audits yield unfavorable outcomes for at least 50% of the audits performed, and Return% is equal or greater than 50% for a quarter of the observations. Ontime attendance is relatively low, with store managers showing up to work on time only 63.2% of the days, and unauthorized absences appear to be concentrated in a small portion of the sample.
Stores appear to operate on average 6.6 days per week and over 28 days per month.
-----Insert Table 1 here ----- financial performance metrics appear to be positively correlated with the pervasiveness of crossselling (BundleInvoice). On the contrary, sales and profitability appear to be negatively correlated with NPS -a potential indicator of aggressive sales techniques being used in the stores.
RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL TESTS
Interestingly the financial performance metrics and on time attendance also seem to be associated with audit failures (AuditFail), suggesting the incidence of missing cash or inventory increases with the volume of sales and the store managers' presence. The percentage of invoices where there is cross selling and on time attendance are higher in stores with more stable managers. Our overall assessment of the correlations among our predictors is that the risk of collinear relations in the definition of our statistical model is not material.
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-----Insert Table 2 here -----
We report the results of our univariate tests in Table 3 . We perform paired t-tests comparing mean performance between the pre-and the post-period (reported in the columns of Table 3 ), as well as comparing mean performance between the treatment and control group stores (reported in the rows). Additionally, we provide a univariate difference-in-differences analysis (comparing the pre-post differences in values of the dependent variables of the treatment vs. the control groups)
in the bottom right corner of Table 3 . While we refrain from drawing conclusions as to the effects of the intervention until we perform our multivariate analyses, the univariate results shed light on several interesting trends.
The financial performance measures (LogSales, LogGrossProfit) exhibit a significant mean decline in the control group but not in the treatment group, though the difference-in-differences analysis indicates no significant difference in the changes in financial performance between the treatment and control group. Univariate tests with respect to changes in nonfinancial dimensions of performance yield contrasting results, as one productive, nonfinancial performance metric related to customer satisfaction (NPS) exhibits a significant improvement, while the other, crossselling performance (BundleInvoice), deteriorates in the post period. However, we cannot conclude that the improvement in NPS is necessarily a consequence of the 360 o system, because we observe similar trends in both treated and control stores. Regarding the effects of the intervention on counterproductive behaviors, we find a decrease in Return% and AuditFail for both groups of stores, which may have been driven by tighter monitoring in the post-period. The probability of observing UnauthorizedAbsences is lower in the post period for the treated stores but not for control stores.
-----Insert Table 3 here ----- Table 4 summarizes our multivariate analyses. We perform separate estimations of model (1) for each of our dependent variables of interest, using OLS regressions with store fixed effects and standard errors clustered by store; for the prediction of dependent variables represented by indicator variables (namely, AuditFail, and UnauthorizedAbsence) we utilize a linear probability model with store fixed effects and standard errors clustered by store. Since model (1) is specified as using a difference-in-differences approach, our primary coefficient of interest is β 2 , which is associated with the interaction term (Post*Treatment). β 2 is positive and significant with respect to LogSales (β 2 = 0.248, p<0.05) and LogGrossProfit (β 2 = 0.277, p<0.05). Thus, we reject the null hypothesis formalized with H1 and conclude that the introduction of the 360 o system motivated store teams to exert effort toward increasing financial performance above and beyond the effort induced by the existing incentive plan. This result is consistent with the 360° system having a positive effect on financial performance through clarifying goals, activating organizational identification, and/or increasing implicit incentives.
Surprisingly, our tests fail to find support in favor of H2 or H3, as we find no significant changes with respect to measures of nonfinancial performance (NPS, BundleInvoice) or with respect to indicators of dysfunctional behaviors (AuditFail, Return%, OnTime%, UnauthorzedAbsence) above and beyond improvements observed for the control stores. This defeats the objective that the company had of introducing the 360° system to shift the store managers' allocation of effort from short term financial goals (included in the existing explicit incentive system) to organizational values focused on the long term sustainability of the firm. This suboptimal allocation of effort may potentially be explained by a lack of understanding of the core values or of how to act in accordance with those values; by lack of attention to subjective measures that the store managers could manipulate by influencing the raters; or by a reinforcement of the importance of the financial measures the employees already understood, considered important, and yielded monetary incentives. 13 Furthermore, employees could have experienced tension between implementing aggressive sales tactics to maximize daily revenues versus building a long term relationship with a customer by understanding and meeting their needs by providing the right set of products-which may have produced lower sales or which might not have been available at the store at the time of the interaction. Qualitative information obtained from interviews provides some insights into some of the possible causes of the 360° system having no discernible impact on the 13 Our results are robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects (week or month dummies, depending on the frequency of collection of the corresponding dependent variable), and to the inclusion in the sample of the store (originally excluded from the dataset) that was open immediately before the beginning of our sample period, and closed immediately after. We do not report these additional tables in this manuscript.
nonfinancial measures or dysfunctional behaviors. We describe the insights gleaned from these interviews in the next section.
Taken together, our empirical tests depict a counterintuitive result. While the intent of the implementation of a values-based 360 o assessment system was to increase effort toward dimensions supporting long term organizational success, the observed outcomes indicate an exacerbation of the distortions that the system was supposed to reduce (i.e. it led to an increased focus on short-term performance measures, sales and gross profits). The introduction of the 360 o system did indeed incentivize greater effort, but not in a uniform way across all dimensions of performance, or in the way that was desired. Our results are in line with prior literature on multitasking, whereby individuals tend to allocate effort suboptimally, placing greater focus on activities that are more clearly measured, that they know how to perform, that are related to financial incentives, and that have a shorter feedback loop.
-----Insert Table 4 here -----
QUALITATIVE ANALYSES
During the months of May and June of 2015 we performed a series of follow-up interviews to gauge the sentiment of MoPhI's employees with respect to the 360 o system. 14 store staff members representing 5 stores randomly selected from the treated stores were interviewed using a structured interview questionnaire (see Appendix 5).
Descriptive evidence gleaned from interview responses indicates that the introduction of the new core values, especially those associated with activities that were not previously explicitly incentivized in the existing reward system (such as enhancing customer value) were unclear or generated confusion. Among the employees who participated in the interviews, 80% could not recall or explain the new core values, and the remaining 20% gave inaccurate recollections.
14 Employees also often brought up issues with the availability of inventory, which was often described as inadequate to meet the needs of customers, thereby pointing to another aspect that could have led to a suboptimal allocation of effort in building customer relations-that is, the lack of tools and support deemed necessary to attain the assigned goals. Finally, 28% of the interviewees complained about salaries not being paid on time, and lack of managerial support.
Based on this evidence, we conjecture that store managers might have perceived management's request to commit to the long term success of the company by adding responsibilities related to the core values as an unfair request, whereby the organization would not demonstrate a clear commitment to either the core values or to its employees (i.e. paying salaries on time, providing support, etc.).
The results of this study were illuminating to the managing director, who subsequently took various steps to further promote and clarify the company's values and to improve employee support (including paying salaries on time, and increasing support to store managers through coaching and systems).
CONCLUSIONS
This study explores the effectiveness of a values-based 360 o performance assessment system as a means to improve alignment in an organization already motivating its employees via incentives tied to financial performance. We posit that the introduction of a 360 o system focused on core organizational values can shift employee attention to supporting organizational sustainability by increasing goal clarity, activating employees' organizational identification, and 14 Note that the initial launch and re-launch of the 360 o system were the only times when store employees were exposed to the new core values. The core values were not disseminated subsequent to the launches in the interests of helping to ensure that there were no spillover effects to the control stores. However, this feature of the rollout, which was necessary for the purposes of the field experiment, likely contributed to the employees' recall issues.
incorporating implicit incentives (via multi-directional monitoring and highlighting opportunities for growth within the organization).
We developed and implemented a field experiment in collaboration with a mobile phone retail chain based in India, where the existing incentive system already rewarded behaviors related to sales and short term profitability with substantial monetary awards. The intervention aimed at correcting for the distortions that such an incentive system had introduced, as a consequence of its predominant focus on short term activities. As part of the experiment, the company management formalized and communicated a company vision and core values, and introduced a 360 o system in half of its stores. The pre-existing incentive system was not modified, and no additional explicit rewards were introduced during our sample period.
Results of our statistical analyses show that the intervention yielded somewhat counterintuitive results. On the one hand, introducing a values-based 360 o assessment system had a positive effect on effort allocated to dimensions of performance that are more clearly measured, more subject to the control of the employee, have a shorter feedback loop, and are associated with explicit monetary incentives, consistent with prior theory work. Despite an unaltered reward system, performance related to sales and profitability improves in the stores that are exposed to the 360 o system. On the other hand, the system did not fully accomplish the main goal that was set at the outset-aligning employees' goals toward dimensions of long term performance and sustainability for the firm. Insights obtained from interviews with members of the organization support the interpretation that introducing new organizational goals might generate suboptimal allocation of effort, thereby failing to motivate employees to engage in behaviors perceived as confusing, incompatible with other goals, or inadequately supported by the organization.
Our findings contribute to the literature on multi-source performance appraisal systems by highlighting both their benefits as drivers of sustainable performance (consistent with improvements in goal clarity, organizational identification, and implicit incentives) and potential side effects that might weaken their effectiveness as facilitators of goal alignment, resulting in suboptimal allocation of efforts on some of the dimensions promoted by the appraisal system. We provide a contribution to the study of performance in multitasking conditions in a setting where financial incentives are associated only with some of the desired behaviors. Finally, we contribute to the practice of management accounting by documenting benefits of introducing 360° systems and also potential pitfalls that managers need to take into consideration when implementing a 360°
performance appraisal system with the objective of improving organizational alignment.
Appendix 1: Mechanisms through which a 360° performance assessment system complementing financial-based incentives can affect performance Mechanisms Definition Why 360° performance assessment systems complementing financial incentives should affect performance via the mechanism described?
Goal clarity Extent to which the outcome goals and objectives of the job are clearly stated and are well defined (Sawyer 1992) .
The system could increase goal clarity, helping employees understand what behaviors are expected to drive value creation.
In turn, goal clarity leads to greater job satisfaction and sales performance (Sawyer 1992; Arnold et al. 2009) Organizational identity "Perceived oneness with an organization and the experience of the organization's successes and failures as one's own" (Mael and Ashforth 1992) .
360° systems can communicate distinctive values and shared goals, which are antecedents of organizational identification (Mael and Ashforth 1992) . By its very nature, organizational identification directly affects employee alignment with organizational goals (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) .
Implicit Incentives
Implicit non-written contracts between principals and agents regarding discretionary rewards or penalties given to agents based on their performance.
Employees will attempt to perform well along all the dimensions evaluated on a 360° performance appraisal if they perceive that their superiors will implicitly consider those appraisals in discretionary decisions such as granting discretionary bonuses or salary raises, and promoting or firings employees (Baker et al. 1994) Employees that are held accountable for a large number of tasks, may sub-optimally allocate effort (from the organization's perspective) across tasks for three reasons: (1) they may not be experienced enough to know where increased effort would yield the greatest payoff (Griffith and Neely 2009); (2) they may focus on the subset of tasks that they know how to do well, are easy to measure, and/or are most visible (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) ; (3) they choose to focus on the tasks that they are financially rewarded for (Banker et al. 2000) .
Core Value #2: We Give More Value
We give the best combo offers to our customers. For example, our handset plus headphone offer and our handset plus insurance offer are the best value in the market.
We constantly try to learn about the products and services we sell so that we can know what options to offer to our customers and answer their questions better. We help customers with their problems in any way we can. We work to build long term relationships with our customers so that they will visit MoPhI again. 2.8 Do you make long term relationships with customers? 2.9 Do you ask all promoters and the cashier to make long term relationships with customers? 2.10 Do you make accurate commitments to the customer? (For example, you do not promise that a number will be activated in 3 days, or promise that a handset will be repaired within a certain amount of time if you do not know when it will be repaired)
In this question, NEVER means you make promises you do not know MoPhI can fulfill, such as those in the examples, to all of your customers SOMETIMES means you make promises you do not know MoPhI can fulfill, such as those in the examples, to about half of your customers ALWAYS means you never make promises you do not know MoPhI can fulfill, such as those in the examples, to any of your customers 2.11 Do you instruct all promoters and the cashier to make only accurate commitments to the customer? 2.12 Do you help customers that have problems? (Some examples of helping are giving your mobile number to the customer, solving activation problems, showing the customer the way to the service center, or even personally going to the service center with the customer, or sending some person from the store to the service center with the customer)
In this question, NEVER means you never take any action to help the store's customers that have problems SOMETIMES means you take one or more actions, such as those described in the examples, to help about half of the store's customers that have problems ALWAYS means you take one or more actions, such as those described in the examples, to help all of the store's customers that have problems 2.13 Do you tell everyone in the store to help customers with problems? 2.14 Do you tell everyone in the store to give the same respect to all customers regardless of their purchase amount? (For example, to be equally respectful to a customer wanting a small Rs. 10 recharge and a customer buying an apple phone) 2.15 Do you tell everyone in the store to be respectful to irritated customers?
Core Value #3: We are Honest and Ethical
We are always honest and ethical and we do the right thing at the store every day. We believe that this is the only way to make our store and MoPhI successful.
Select a number between 1 and 5 for every question where 1 means Never, 2 means Rarely, 3 means Sometimes, 4 means Very often, and 5 means Always.
3.1
Are you trustworthy to customers? (Examples of NOT being trustworthy are telling lies about what is being sold to the customer, selling fake products, changing the original batteries of the handset for cheaper batteries, taking the customers' money based on false promises)
In this question, NEVER means you take at least one action that is "not trustworthy," such as those described in the examples, with all of the customers you serve SOMETIMES means you take at least one action that is "not trustworthy", such as those described in the examples, with about half of the customers you serve ALWAYS means you never take an action that is "not trustworthy" with any of the customers you serve 3.2 Do you tell all promoters and the cashier to be trustworthy to customers? 3.3 Do you stop wrong activity against the company? (Examples of wrong activities are: stealing, lying, giving unauthorized discounts to friends or family, selling products that are not coming from HO at the store, people making profits for themselves when serving a customer, borrowing store cash or allowing someone to borrow store cash)
In this question, NEVER means you never stop wrong activities SOMETIMES means you stop about half of the wrong activities that you notice, such as those described in the examples ALWAYS means you stop all of the wrong activities that you notice, such as those described in the examples 3.4 Do you report wrong activity against the company to HO?
Please select "Cannot Answer" if there hasn't been any wrong activity. 3.5
Are you honest at the store? (Being honest means not doing any wrong activity) In this question, NEVER means you do at least one wrong activity, such as those described in the examples, one or more times a day SOMETIMES means you do at least one wrong activity, such as those described in the examples, about once a week ALWAYS means you never do any wrong activity 3.6 Do you tell the cashier and the promoters to be always honest in the store? 3.7 Do you transfer promoters out of your store for personal issues? Notes: Table 2 reports the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients across all variables of interest in this study. Statistical significance is indicated, respectively, with: * = (p<0.01); ** = (p<0.05); *** = (p<0.01). All variables are defined in Appendix 4. !"#$%#&'()" *,, = . + 0 1 !%23 , + 0 4 !%23 , * 6#"'3&"(3 * + 0 7 83%#"9'(':"#;ℎ'(:" * + 0 > 8'?"2@'A2 * + 0 B 83%#" CDE"F G$$")32 + H Notes: We use a difference-in-differences specification and estimate regression coefficients using OLS with standard errors clustered by store.
Because the assignment of a store to the treatment versus control group is time-invariant, the inclusion of store fixed effects causes the coefficient relative to the variable Treatment not to be estimated, hence we are not reporting a row for this variable in Table 4 . With respect to the model predicting AuditFail, and UnauthorizedAbsence, we estimated our coefficients using a linear probability model to allow for the inclusion of fixed effects. In order to maintain the symmetry in the length of the pre-and post-period, having performance data available for only 11 weeks after the introduction of the 360 o system. The variable SalesDays is expressed as the number of days the store was open for business in the week (month) if the model is estimated to predict a weekly (monthly) dependent variable. In all cases, t-statistics are reported in parentheses underneath the corresponding estimated coefficient. Statistical significance is indicated, respectively, with: * = (p<0.01); ** = (p<0.05); *** = (p<0.01). Our estimations are performed using the Stata procedure xtreg, with fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the store level. While this procedure yields appropriate standard errors, the R 2 is generally underestimated. In the last row we report the R 2 relative to the estimation of the same model using the Stata procedure areg, which fits a linear regression absorbing the categorical factor Store, which yields a more realistic R 2 in settings where the number of clusters is large.
